



Thomas J. Watson Research Center

Design and Implementation of a TCG-based Integrity Measurement Architecture

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Overview


- Problem – Runtime integrity guarantees
- Solution – Hierarchical software-stack measurements
 - Load guarantees
 - Property attestation
- Current Implementation
- Future Work

Problem – What is the Integrity of a System?


- Insecure networked world
- SSL and IPSEC provide secure channels
Answers: With **whom** am I interacting **securely**?

Open Problem:


How can you trust this system ?



Trusted Computing Group Architecture



Integrity Measurement Architecture – Solution




TPM-Based Integrity Measurement Architecture

- Achievement of our Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA)
 - Extend TPM-based attestation into the system runtime**
 - Attest the Software Stack**
- IMA-Guarantees
 - **Non-intrusive** (not changing system behavior)
 - **Load-guarantees** for code loaded into the system run-time
 - **Detects systems cheating** with the measurement list
- Goals
 - **Negligible overhead** on attested system
 - **Usability**

Example: Web Server

- **Executables**
(Program & Libraries)
 - apachectl, httpd, java, ..
 - mod_ssl.so, mod_auth.so, mod_cgi.so,..
 - libc-2.3.2.so libjvm.so, libjava.so, ...
- **Configuration Files**
 - httpd.conf, html-pages,
 - httpd-startup, catalina.sh, servlet.jar
- **Unstructured Input**
 - HTTP-Requests
 - Management Data



IMA Implementation – File Measurements

Measurement = SHA1(File Contents) at load time

- **Kernel** measures: kernel modules, programs, and shared libraries
- **Applications** measure their own critical input

Examples:

Bash Shell measures: scripts before execution

Future: Java, Perl, Apache, Jakarta Tomcat ...

Advantage


Unique Software-Fingerprints (e.g. sendmail-8.12.8-9.90)

→ **Secure hash represents well known security properties**


IMA Implementation – Measurement List Maintenance

Measurement list aggregation:


- **Compute** 160bit-SHA1 over the contents of the data (measurement)
- **Adjust** Protected hw Platform Configuration Register (PCR) to maintain measurement list integrity value
- **Add** measurement to ordered measurement list
 - Executable content is recorded before it impacts the system
 - That is, before it can corrupt the system



IMA Implementation – Measurements by the Kernel



IMA Implementation – Measurements by Applications



Example: Rootkit compromise analysis

Measurement List	Fingerprint DB
000 : D6DC07881A7EFD58EB8E9184CCA723AF4212D3DB	boot_aggregate
001 : 84ABD2960414CA4A448E0D2C9364B4E1725BDA4F	init
002 : 194D956F288B36FB46E46A124E59D466DE7C73B6	ld-2.3.2.so
003 : 7DF33561E2A467A87CDD4BB8F68880517D3CAECB	libc-2.3.2.so
...	...
110 : F969BD9D27C2CC16BC668374A9FBA9D35B3E1AA2	syslogd
...	

(a) THE GOOD CASE

...	
110 : F969BD9D27C2CC16BC668374A9FBA9D35B3E1AA2	syslogd
...	...
525 : 4CA3918834E48694187F5A4DAB4EECD540AA8EA2	syslogd-LRK5
...	

(b) LRK5-COMPROMISED SYSLOGD





Results

Attested System:

- Implementation: ~ 5000 LOC (LSM kernel module)
- About 400-600 measurements for Fedora C2, Apache, Jakarta Tomcat, etc.
- Measurement Overhead

	Kernel	Application	Likelihood
Clean Hit	~ 0.1 μ s	~ 5 μ s	>> 99 %
New (TPM) Measurement	~ 5 ms + SHA1 (~80MB/s)	~ 5ms + SHA1 (~80MB/s)	<< 1 %

Attestation service:

- Known Fingerprint DB ~ 20 000 Fingerprints (RedHat 9.0, Fedora, ES3)
- Attestation: 1-2 second "latency" (unoptimized demonstration)

Ongoing & Future Work

Open-Source Integrity Measurement Architecture

→ LSM kernel module

Isolation of unknown or distrusted measurements

→ Measure Information flow between executables

Predict future system states

→ Measure SELinux policy and enforcement


Thank You!

Further Information

http://www.research.ibm.com/secure_systems_department/projects/tcglinux

BACKUP

Trusted Platform Module (TPM)



- Trusted Computing Group – Industry Consortium
 - open interface specification of TPM (current version 1.2)
- Independent Manufacturers for TPM chips, glued onto system
- TPM offers protected hw registers (and more)
- TPM includes Public Endorsement Key
 - Endorsement key signature provides identity and integrity
 - Endorsement key certificate includes platform information
- TCG specifies use of TPM to realize:
 - Hardware Platform Certification
 - Boot Configuration attestation up to boot-loader

IMA Implementation (V) – Measurement list

Real measurement list (cat /proc/tcg/measurements):

#000:	D6DC07881A7EFD58EB8E9184CCA723AF4212D3DB	boot_aggregate	
#001:	84ABD2960414CA4A448E0D2C9364B4E1725BDA4F	init	[executable]
#002:	9ECF02F90A2EE2080D4946005DE47968C8A1BE3D	ld-2.3.2.so	[library]
#003:	336536B0E22FF762BB539D7FCB7CD283D4622342	libc-2.3.2.so	[library]
#004:	A4DC5EDF06698646CD76916F16E95C37E55DC12B	bash	[executable]
...			
#027:	2AC8FD6000DDEAA7BD10D7D4E3CE56868100980D	clock	[bashsource]
#028:	C0F7BCEF34A2AA7DAECC2B1648C02FB7CFEC9A3D	hwclock	[executable]
...			
#070:	01B33D515C3B23F1AB0BAEF845F0A3CA079E9A1E	rc	[bashscript]
#071:	CEBA19AE012DBC2E1A3E428070D2C90A695F1AA4	runlevel	[executable]
#072:	2998794AD01E6D145EA7EF96A831B05584298ED4	egrep	[bashscript]
#073:	68464F40452AB4B63707C3925CA7EC71A7E3B72D	kudzu	[bashscript]
#074:	4CAFF329BF20F736E9E14B4123E0E5F88D8D418D	lang.sh	[bashsource]
...			
#080:	147D5593003A8A0DDFA3B27430734F804F388168	parport	[module]
#081:	F94054C5C1B38136C72FB1A56EE6F100AB090115	parport_pc	[module]
...			
#244:	D312491B8247E897D708407543B5369D12E0DA7C	rc.local	[bashscript]
#245:	BB2CEA2BA56CCC3D20BDECA554D2976DA0D5AAB3	mingetty	[executable]
...			




Measurement Implementation (II) – Example

`execve(bash)`

`file_mmap(/bin/bash)`

`M=SHA1(/bin/bash)`



`mmap/run(bash)`

TPM Register Example

Manufacturer: 0x41544d4c

TCG version: 1.1

Firmware version: 0.6

PCRs: 16

DIRs: 2

Slots: 10

DIR-00: 00

DIR-01: 00

PCR-00: 8F 99 36 66 55 E5 09 69 AF FB 3B 08 C9 F6 9B 38 7E 62 D3 75

PCR-01: 99 7D 7E DD 91 D3 8D BE 19 1F 78 F2 1A 4C 7E 9C 65 C6 BA 61

PCR-02: EB B3 BA AE E7 57 4B B6 37 AA AB 67 0F 9A C1 BC EB 6F 80 F3

PCR-03: 04 FD EC DD 50 1D AF 0F 62 4C 1F 99 60 12 CF 30 44 FF 46 10

PCR-04: BC 68 F2 66 F8 B7 5E 55 8C D2 74 70 B7 0B 53 20 0B 48 0F AB

PCR-05: DF 82 43 3F B8 7C 24 09 31 B0 8A 39 B9 63 4A 48 58 A7 FB 97

PCR-06: 04 FD EC DD 50 1D AF 0F 62 4C 1F 99 60 12 CF 30 44 FF 46 10

PCR-07: 31 20 AA 10 F2 D4 23 E9 4D 2C 59 3A 00 1B 02 44 42 B1 DE 65

PCR-08: 00

PCR-09: 00

PCR-10: 51 69 57 67 92 71 56 BB 18 D2 5C 9B 87 CB 01 C8 45 FD 7D 65

PCR-11: 00

PCR-12: 00

PCR-13: 00


PCR-14: 00

PCR-15: 00

Type: Atmel TPM

Bus controller: Intel ICH4 LPC

Recap



Future (Ongoing) Work

■ Integrity Measurement Architecture

Open-Source IMA

→ LSM kernel module

Information flow analysis

→ Attestation space partitioning

→ Intergration of information flow into the LSM kernel module

Attest Policy Enforcement

→ Predictable properties

→ SELinux-Integration (subject, object label)

Integrity Measurement Architecture – Validation

Detecting Cheating Systems

1. send 160bit-nonce (unpredictable)
- 2.a receive measurement list
- 2.b receive {nonce, PCR}_{TPM_Signature}
3. validate TPM_Signature and nonce
4. validate list (virtual extension)

Tampering with the signed PCR is recognized in 3

Tampering with the list is recognized in 4

IMA – Software Stack Measurements

