

Lecture 15 - Web Security

CSE497b - Spring 2007


Introduction Computer and Network Security

Professor Jaeger

www.cse.psu.edu/~tjaeger/cse497b-s07/


Web Server

- Entry point for clients
 - To a variety of *services*
 - *Customized* for clients (e.g., via cookies)
 - Supported by *complex backend applications* (e.g., databases)
- Target of attackers
 - *Common protocol*
 - Supports a *wide range of inputs*
 - *Complex* software *interactions*
 - Running with *high privilege*
- Q: How does this impact?
 - Vulnerabilities, Threats, Risks



Web Server Deployments


- Note the multiple application layers and connection to legacy code



MOM = Message-oriented middleware
 CRM = Customer relationship management
 ETL = Extract Translate Load


Web Server Software

- E.g., IIS 7



Web Server Architecture

- Server Components



Server-side Scripting

- Program placed directly in content, run at during request time and output returned in content
 - MS active server pages (ASP)
 - PHP
 - mod_perl
 - server-side JavaScript
 - python,
- Nice at generating output
 - Dangerous if tied to user input



Dynamic Content Security

- Largely just applications
 - Inasmuch as application are secure
 - Command shells, interpreters, are dangerous
- Three things to prevent DC vulnerabilities
 - Validate input
 - Input often received as part of user supplied data
 - E.g., cookie
 - Limit program functionality
 - Don't leave open ended-functionality
 - Execute with limited privileges



Web Server Vulnerabilities

- Not surprisingly, these are numerous
- For IIS 5, focus was on function
 - All services were ON by default
 - Buffer overflow -- e.g., Code Red
- Interactions between components are complex
 - HTTP input to database queries
 - SQL Injection -- execute user input directly
- Web server permissions
 - Web servers have broad access
 - Deface web server -- modify server files
 - Compromise system -- modify system files

What can be done?

- Checklist for IIS 5
 - windows.stanford.edu/docs/IISsecchecklist.htm
 - Gives an idea of what must be done for IIS
- Some examples
 - “Disable all unnecessary ISAPI filters [services]”
 - “Delete DLLs [libraries] associated with disabled filters”
 - “Website must never be on the system drive”
 - “Only necessary services” -- only SMTP
 - “Remove NTFS write permissions where possible”
 - Obscurity
 - “Don’t use obvious names for script and code directories”
 - “Set default website to extreme security”
- IIS 7 does many of these -- automate all?

Web Server as a Host Security Problem

- Adversary's Goal
 - Integrity/Secrecy/Availability
 - Get code running on your system
 - That is under the adversary's control
- Ways to Execute Code
 - Accessible interfaces
 - Defense: minimize attack surface
 - Vulnerable interfaces
 - Defense: prevent various code injections: buffer overflows
- Privilege
 - Attackers want this code to do as much as possible
 - Defense: minimize its privilege

Canonical (common) DOS - Request Flood


- Attack: request flooding
 - Overwhelm some resource with legitimate requests
 - e.g., web-server, phone system



- Note: unintentional flood is called a *flash crowd*

DOS Prevention - Reverse-Turing Tests


- *Turing test*: measures whether a human can tell the difference between a human or computer (AI)
- *Reverse Turing tests*: measures whether a user on the internet is a person, a bot, whatever?
- CAPTCHA - completely automated public Turing test to tell computers and humans apart
 - contorted image humans can read, computers can't
 - image processing pressing SOA, making these harder



- Note: often used not just for DOS prevention, but for protecting “free” services (email accounts)

DOS Prevention - Puzzles

- Make the solver present evidence of “work” done
 - If work is proven, then process request
 - Note: only useful if request processing significantly more work than
- Puzzle design
 - Must be hard to solve
 - Easy to Verify
- Canonical Example
 - Puzzle: given x -bits of input r and $h(r)$, where h is a cryptographic hash function
 - Solution: Invert $h(r)$
 - Q: Assume you are given 108 bits of input for 128-bit hash input, how hard would it be to solve the puzzle?



Take Away

- The complexity of web server (and web client) systems makes ensuring their security complex
 - A single interface (HTTP) enhances function
 - Lots of services can be accessed which makes attack surface large
 - The variety of inputs via this interface makes detecting malicious input very difficult
 - Privileges available to injected code can be sufficient to take over system
- Servers are high profile targets
 - Valuable info (credit cards, private user data)
 - Represent an entity (denial of service)