Scalable Web Content Attestation

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Abstract—The web is a primary means of information sharing for most organizations and people. Currently, a recipient of web content knows nothing about the environment in which that information was generated other than the specific server from whence it came (and even that information can be unreliable). In this paper, we develop and evaluate the Spork system that uses the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) to tie the web server integrity state to the web content delivered to browsers, thus allowing a client to verify that the origin of the content was functioning properly when the received content was generated and/or delivered. We discuss the design and implementation of the Spork service and its browser-side Firefox validation extension. In particular, we explore the challenges and solutions of scaling the delivery of mixed static and dynamic content using exceptionally slow TPM hardware. We perform an in-depth empirical analysis of the Spork system within Apache web servers. This analysis shows Spork can deliver nearly 8,000 static or over 7,000 dynamic integrity-measured web objects per-second. More broadly, we identify how TPM-based content web services can scale with manageable overheads and deliver integrity-measured content with manageable overhead.

Keywords—attestation; integrity measurement; scalability; web content

I. INTRODUCTION

The web has changed the way users and enterprises share information. Where once we shared documents via physical mail or through specialized applications, the web enables sharing content through open protocols. Web server validation, if done at all, is performed via SSL certificates [1]. The certificate indicates that the server (really the private key) has been vouched for by an authority, e.g., Verisign. What is missing is a mechanism that offers security guarantees on the content itself. Approaches like per-document XML signatures [2] provide document authentication, but only work where the data is static and the signing authority is separate from the web server, i.e., the user must either engage external signing authorities or trust the web server to create/handle the content correctly. Ideally, content receivers desire to know a) the origin of content and b) that the origin was functioning properly when the content was generated and delivered. This latter requirement asks for proof of the server integrity state at the time of use.

Consider an online banking application. Users of the system provide credentials, account information, and other sensitive data to the web server as part of its use. For this reason, users need to know more than the identity of the server it is communicating with (as provided by SSL). The users desire some assurance that the server has not been compromised. Similar requirements exist for any web application using sensitive data over untrusted networks, e.g., online auction systems, e-voting systems, online medical applications. Many of these applications must support thousands or millions of clients. Thus, an implicit requirement largely unaddressed by current integrity management approaches is that they scale to large communities.

Augmenting these applications with content integrity information will provide a means to detect and prevent real-world attacks. For example, if a server is compromised with malware, like the Mood-NT kernel rootkit [3], the proof of the system integrity will reveal the presence of the malicious software to the browser. Further, when bound to the content, the integrity proof exposes “in-flight” page changes [4], including advertisement injection, advertisement removal, and URL replacement, independent of whether the man-in-the-middle is present on the server, network, or web cache.

In their seminal paper on integrity measurement systems, Marchesini et al. speak directly to the requirements of building and deploying secure web systems [5]. They state, “[t]he promise of responsibly maintaining a secure site requires that the executable suite, considered as a whole, be dynamic”. Here they highlight the need for more than simple boot time integrity (such as that provided by stored-sealed configurations and systems), but mandate the integrity measurement must be ongoing. They further expand to state any system providing secure content must provide a binding between this evolving system state and the content being served.

The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [6] provides hardware support that enables remote parties (such as content-receiving browsers) to securely identify the software running on the host, i.e., to measure the integrity state of the system by identifying its software. Along with the TPM, some form of integrity measurement system, such as the Linux Integrity Measurement Architecture [7], is needed to create full attestations of the running system state. The mechanism used by the TPM to provide integrity state is the quote operation [8]. Each quote provides an iterative hash of the code loaded as recorded by the tamper-resistant hardware platform configuration registers (PCRs). The TPM signs the PCR state and a 20-byte challenge using a public key associated with the host. The challenge provides freshness of the quote (the remote party offers a challenge as a nonce). We observe that the quote challenge can be used for other purposes such as
binding data to the integrity state of the server that created or delivered it.

In this paper, we explore the requirements and design of the Spork\(^1\) web server service that supports scalable delivery of web content from integrity-measured web servers. Web documents are cryptographically bound to a TPM-based integrity state proof of the server software. The proof is generated from a cryptographic hash of the content, a timestamp retrieved from an integrity-verified time service, and other meta-information. Client browsers (in practice, Firefox extensions) retrieve proofs by acquiring a document indicated in the target page’s meta-information and validate them using the appropriate authority keys.

A naive implementation of this approach would not work well in practice. The cost of performing a TPM quote per request is extraordinarily high—on the order of 900 milliseconds. We address this limitation by using cryptographic dictionaries to efficiently generate content proofs. Cryptographic dictionaries requiring only a single integrity quote are created periodically. Succinct proofs are extracted from the dictionary and delivered to requesting clients. Because such dictionaries can be created frequently (in under a second), proofs for both dynamic and static content can be created efficiently and delivered to clients.

A detailed analysis of the performance of the Spork system illustrates the costs associated with the delivery of proofs for static and dynamic web pages. Here, we explore optimizations that reduce the “bytes-on-the-wire” and computational overheads. Our experiments show that the Spork system can deliver static documents with integrity proofs with manageable overhead, where the throughput of an integrity measured web server reaches nearly 8,000 web objects per-second—within 17% of an unmodified Apache server’s throughput. Moreover, we show empirically that the same content can be delivered with as little as 2.7 milliseconds latency. Because dynamic documents must be bound to the current state of the system at the time it is requested (they cannot be precomputed), their delivery is limited by the TPM. We introduce optimizations to amortize these costs across requests and over embedded objects within the same web page. Further experiments demonstrate that a single Spork-enabled web server serving dynamic pages can sustain over 7,000 web objects per-second with 1000 msec latency (most of which is attributable to the TPM).

An interesting aspect of Spork content proofs is that they can be used asynchronously. Proofs acquired from the web server can be cached with the content itself, e.g. in a Squid cache [?]. Because each proof includes a timestamp acquired from a globally accessible time service, the browser can make a policy decision on whether the cached proof is stale or not. If it is not, the content and proof can be used as if they were obtained from the server. Otherwise, they can be discarded and new ones acquired from the web server. Note also that such policies can be transparently implemented by web proxies via TTL policies.

\(^1\)Not quite a web service, not quite a security service.

II. BACKGROUND

Content served over unsecured HTTP provides no indication as to whether the server or the communication channel have been compromised. If the content is served over an SSL connection, either directly or via a proxy [?], the security is predicated on a certificate that vouches for the authenticity of the web server. The guarantees are linked to the machine rather than the content itself, thus leaving no method of knowing whether the content itself has been manipulated, e.g., by a rootkit or corrupt update.

Providing guarantees on a system’s state requires measurement of the system’s integrity. Many efforts for ensuring integrity measurement exist, including Pioneer [?], CASS Security Kernels [?], TrustedBox [?], Copilot [?], and LKIM [?] among others. Secure processors such as AEGIS [?] and the IBM 4758 [?] provide a secure execution environment that can be used as a basis for deploying secure services. As an example, we examine integrity management using the Linux Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) [?], and its extension the Policy Reduced Integrity Measurement Architecture (PRIMA) [?], for attesting the state of the code executed and running on a system, as IMA does not require changes to programs and its only hardware requirement is the presence of a commodity TPM, which are readily available on desktop and server systems. In brief, the system is measured by taking a SHA-1 hash over every pertinent executable file, a process that begins at system startup, when the BIOS and boot loader are measured. The measurement process continues during the boot process to include the operating system kernel and loaded modules, and upon boot includes all executed applications and supporting libraries. These hashes are collected into a measurement list, which provides an ordered history of system execution.

The measurement list is stored in kernel memory but to prevent tampering, the aggregated hash value is stored on a TPM, which provides protected registers known as Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs). These can only be modified by either rebooting the system, which clears the PCR values to 0, or by the extend function, which aggregates the current content of the PCR with the hash of the executable to be included, hashing these values together and storing the resulting hash back in the PCR. The TPM provides reporting of PCR values through the quote operation. To prevent replay of the measurement, the requestor issues a 160-bit random nonce to the attesting system, creating a challenge. The TPM has a Storage Root Key stored inside it, which only it knows. It uses this key to generate an Attestation Identity Key (AIK), which comprises an RSA key pair, the public portion of which (AIK\(_{pub}\)) is available through a key management interface. The TPM is bootstrapped by loading the private portion of the AIK pair (AIK\(_{priv}\)) and performs the Quote function, where it signs a message containing the values of one or more PCRs and the nonce with AIK\(_{priv}\). The attesting party can verify the integrity of the message using AIK\(_{pub}\), and then every element of the measurement list up to the value stored in the PCR may be validated.
Measurements of the system detect deviations from known good software. For example, the Random JavaScript Toolkit is a rootkit that affects Linux-based Apache servers [17]. It contains a small web server that modifies Apache’s output, by injecting malicious JavaScript, before it is transmitted to the victim. Under IMA, the binary would be added to the measurement list when it was loaded, and this new binary measurement would not be in the list of known-good hashes. Similarly, if a malicious patch was made to a system binary, or if an unapproved or outdated binary was being used, these would be discovered through measurement and comparison with the known-good hashes.

A byproduct of the content integrity information is that it also protects against “in-flight” page modifications, e.g., within web caches. In [17], the authors show that the content of web pages is modified in a number of different ways including advertisement injection, such as provided by the NebuAd service [17]. Our system is able to ensure that “in-flight” page changes are discovered. The authors identify several other classes of modifications, including page modifications such as image distillation [17] or advertisement removal by a proxy [17], [17], and also types of malware that modified pages viewed by the user, such as the Adware.LinkMaker [17] which creates links in the page that the publisher did not include, or W32.Arpiframe [17], which injects content into HTTP streams on a local subnet.

III. DESIGN

In this section, we provide a detailed description of an architecture for scalable web content attestation. A central observation is that to date, attestation-based systems present a challenge to the TPM in the form of a randomized nonce, in order to receive a TPM quote. The nonce ensures the freshness of the quote but provides no semantics beyond that. In our system, by contrast, we directly tie the content to the system’s integrity state through the use of a cryptographic proof system that succinctly represents the content served; this is used along with the current time as a challenge to the TPM. In this manner, we provide stronger guarantees about content origin, and when it was served, than have been found in past proposals.

A. System Overview

An overview of the system architecture is shown in Figure 1. The core elements of the system are a) a web server that generates static or dynamic web content and provides clients with content integrity proofs, b) a time server that supplies the web server with an attestation of the current time, providing bounds on when the web server’s attestations were generated, and c) a web browser, to which we have added an extension that verifies the proofs received from the web server and can securely query the time server to independently verify its attestation. The system operates as follows:

- A client requests a page from the web server, which returns the content and a URL to the content attestation.
- The server hashes a TPM quote from the time server concatenated with a cryptographic proof system similar to an authenticated dictionary [23]. It uses the resulting hash as a challenge to the TPM to generate a system attestation.
- The client acquires and validates attestations from the web server and the time server, and computes the root of the cryptographic proof system based on the proof received from the server.

The rest of this section describes how content proofs are generated and scheduled, and in the next section, we describe in greater detail how each of the system components are implemented and how they operate.

B. Content Proofs

Each document received by a client is tied to the integrity state of the web server via its content proof. Ideally, we desire a proof with the following semantics: the proof should state a) that a particular page was served by a given web server, b) that the web server had a verifiable integrity state (which can be assessed for validity), and c) that the binding between the page and integrity state occurred at a verifiably known time. For ease of exposition, we begin with a simple proof and build toward more semantically rich and efficient constructions that provide these properties.

First, let us introduce the notation used throughout. The function \( h(d) \) denotes a cryptographic hash over some data \( d \), and concatenation of different data elements is denoted as \(|\cdot|\). The quoting hosts are denoted \( H_w \) for the web server and \( H_{TS} \) for the time server. \( per_i \) denotes the integrity state of host \( i \). A TPM quote is denoted \( \text{Quote}(h, s, c) \), where \( h \) is the host identity performing the quote, \( s \) is the PCR state, and \( c \) is the quote challenge. The served pages are denoted \( p_i \), where each \( i \) represents a unique page. \( t_i \) is a time epoch returned from a hardware clock on the time server. Lastly, described below, \( CPS_i \) represents the root node of a cryptographic proof system and \( Pf(p_i) \) is a succinct proof for page \( p_i \) from that system.

Consider a simple content proof to be received by a client from a server for a page \( p_i \), as follows:

\[\text{CPS}_i \rightarrow Pf(p_i) \]

In practice, the quote mechanism uses attestation identity key (or simply the signing key) to perform the quote. Thus, the key acts as a proxy for the host. For the purposes of this section, we blur this distinction between the host and the signing key.
The quote operation provides a clear binding: document $p_i$ was generated by (or is at least present on or known to) $H_w$ with PCR state $pcr_{H_w}$. Of course, the proof is not tied to any particular time. In tangible terms, properties $a$ (web server identity) and $b$ (integrity state) from above are provided. What is missing from the simple proof is $c$ (the element of time). Thus any page delivered to a client at any time could be replayed forever, i.e., a compromised server delivering stale content could not be detected.

Figure 2 describes a more semantically rich content proof construction that simultaneously ties content to both the host and time. In this, the time server acts as a root of trust in providing a self-certified timestamp (that uses the timestamp itself as the quote challenge). The time server is trusted to provide the correct time (by definition of a root of trust [?]), and its quote mechanism is a means of tying a specific timestamp to that trusted service. We revisit the design and security issues of the time service in Section IV-B.

During the validation process, the client acquires a timestamp from the time server directly (or uses a suitably fresh timestamp from its cache). The client will then judge whether the content is too stale to trust, i.e., the difference between the timestamp in the proof and that received from the time server is too great. Because the time service is trusted, the content could not be detected.

Thus any page delivered to a client at any time could be replayed forever, i.e., a compromised server delivering stale content could not be detected.

The central limitation of the proposed content proof construction is cost. Web servers may receive many hundreds or thousands of requests per second (RPS). The above proof would take about a second to generate on commodity hardware (including the round-trip time (RTT) delay to acquire the timestamp and the 900 msec for the quote operation in our test environment). Because a unique proof is needed per page/timestamp, the web server would not be able to serve content at a reasonable rate, i.e., the web server RPS would be $\approx 1$. What is a needed is a means to amortize quote costs.

A cryptographic proof system is a construction used to efficiently authenticate collections of objects using one or more cryptographic operations. Objects can be validated by extracting succinct proofs from the proof system. These succinct proofs are generally significantly smaller that the proof system as a whole. Thus, authentication costs are amortized over collections of objects. While more sophisticated techniques exist [?], [?], we concentrate on a conceptually simple proof system based on the Merkle hash trees [?]. We create a proof system for all of the documents that will be served by the web server. Assume for the moment that the web server has a static collection of pages that it delivers to clients (we extend our solution to dynamic content generation in the next section). To create the proof system for these static documents, all of the documents are arranged as an ordered sequence of pages $p_1 \ldots p_w$. As shown in Figure 4, a binary tree is initially constructed by assigning the hash of each page $h(p_i)$ as a leaf, and each interior node is the hash of the concatenation of both its children. The root node is $CPS_r$. The succinct proof for page $p_i$, denoted $Pf(p_i)$, consists of the root node and all of the siblings on the path to the root. For example, the proof system for page $p_3$ in Figure 4 is $\{ h(p_4), h(h(p_1)\|h(p_2)) \}$. A proof recipient can then validate the content by hashing the file and computing $h(h(h(p_1)\|h(p_2))\|h(h(p_3)\|h(p_4)))$. The proofs are succinct in the sense that they grow logarithmically in the number of documents in the proof system, i.e., the size of the proof is $(\log_2 n) + 1) * H + S$, where $H$ and $S$ are the sizes of the hash and signature respectively.

The proof system is used to generate an extended content proof for page $p_i$ is shown in Figure 3. The two differences between this construction and the preceding one are that the $CPS_r$ is used as the challenge (instead of a document hash), and that a succinct proof for $p_i$ is included. Because a single quote is used to bind any number of pages to the time quote and host integrity state, we can efficiently support serving a large body of pages. As we discuss below, the challenge is knowing exactly what the body of documents is.

C. Proof Scheduling

Content proofs are delivered to browsers through integrity proof pages. The web server inserts an extension X-Attest-URL HTTP header in each delivered page whose URL points to a proof for that page. The browser parses the header, retrieves the proof from the web server, and validates
requests are directed by the requested URL, the Apache web server generates the next quote. Once the next quote is generated (Q0), this new quote is provided to each incoming request.

The validation fails, the browser can log the error, notify the user, or perform other actions deemed appropriate. We discuss the design and operation of the Firefox-based client software in section VI.

Determining what pages should be included in a proof system is essential to supporting the browsing community. Static web pages represent the simplest case. As illustrated in Figure 5, the web server generates a Merkle hash tree of all pages it will be serving to clients. The web server will then generate proofs at the rate at which the TPM can generate quotes, e.g., once a second. When a browser asks for a proof for a given page, the succinct proof is extracted from the most recent proof system completed and returned to the browser, as shown in Figure 6. A proof is always available because the content is unchanging. Thus, the latency induced by the integrity proofs is bounded by the proof acquisition (a web page GET) and browser validation costs.

Dynamic content presents other challenges. Centrally, the page content only becomes available after the request arrives from a client. For example, consider a .php [?] web page. PHP allows the web designer to create content programmatically. The inputs to this process include refererrer page, URL, query strings, database contents, cookies, and other information. Because the inputs are unknowable, precomputation of pages is infeasible in many cases, and the web server must create integrity proofs in real time.

As illustrated in Figure 7, our approach is to exploit the periodicity of quote generation. The web server creates and delivers content through dynamic generation interfaces, e.g., PHP, as in normal operation. However, the proof identified in the X-Attest-URL header identifies a proof that does not yet exist. The web server caches hashes of the dynamic content delivered since the last quote was completed. As soon as the TPM becomes available (by completing a previous quote), a hash tree of recent dynamic content is generated and used as the challenge to the TPM. The proof system becomes available as soon as the quote operation completes.

The browser will observe additional latency when receiving dynamic content. Assuming a 900 msec quote operation (which is the case in our test environment) and uniform distribution of arrivals, the expected latency would be about 1350 msec plus the time to deliver the quote itself (which is network dependent). More specifically, the expected arrival in the previous quote epoch is 0.5 * 900 = 450 msec plus the quote cost itself 900 msec is the expected delay observed by a browser. Note that this will be interleaved with the delivery (and possibly rendering) of the content itself, and thus the observed delay may be somewhat less.

Most web servers simultaneously support static and dynamic content. The above processes can support this operation by simply joining the static and dynamic hash trees at the root, and using the resulting hash as the challenge. In all other respects, the web content is processed as before—proofs for static content can be extracted from the most recent proof system, while proofs for dynamic pages will become available at the completion of the following quote epoch. No other modifications to the web server are needed.

IV. IMPLEMENTATION

We have developed a version of the architecture detailed in the preceding sections that supports static, dynamic, and mixed content. Figure 8 shows the structure of the Spork web environment. In addition to external clients and the time service, there are two functional elements processing the requests on the web host; the web server and Spork daemon.

A. Proof-Generating Web Server

As directed by the requested URL, the Apache web server supporting Spork directs all client requests (1 in Figure 8) to Spork threads processing requests running in the httpd address space. If the request is for a static page, the content is retrieved from the local filesystem. A URL to a
The time server plays a critical role in operation of the system, because of the importance of freshness to verifying attestations. While the web server has a file system that is mutable, due to the ability to add, delete, or modify web files to be served, the time server’s file system can become largely static after it is installed. As a result, we can provide deeper validation than what is afforded with typical integrity measurement. We provide trust guarantees from the system clock all the way to the software, forming a time root of trust in a similar manner to how a root of trust installer fully guarantees the system from installation up to applications [?]. This approach provides a smaller base of components that need to be trusted: the BIOS core root of trust measurement (CRTM), the TPM, and the clock.

Another requirement solved by this approach is the ability for the client to directly verify the attestation from the time server itself. If the client establishes an SSL connection with the time server, it can receive the same time stamp update that is presented to the web server, allowing confirmation of the validity of the time attestation and verification of functionality. Once the client has established trust with the time server, it can rely on attestations that are carried in the HTML document presented to it by the web server.

V. EVALUATION

In this section, we empirically evaluate the performance and scalability of the Spork system presented in the preceding sections. We begin by measuring the throughput and latency of the system compared to an unmodified Apache web server, and expose the underlying costs via microbenchmarking. We propose a number of optimizations and evaluate the performance impact.

All tests were performed on Dell PowerEdge M605 blades with 8-core 2.3GHz Dual Quad-core AMD Opteron processors, 16.0GB RAM, and 2x73GB SAS Drives (RAID 1). Six blades running Ubuntu 8.04.1 LTS Linux kernel version 2.6.24 were connected over a Gigabit Ethernet switch on a quiescent network. One blade ran Apache web servers (one normal install and one running the integrity proof system described in the preceding sections). One blade ran the time server, and four were used for simulated clients. All experiments use the Apache 2.2.8 server with mod_python 3.3.1 modules for dynamic content generation. The Spork daemon is written in Python 2.5.2 and uses a custom TPM integration library written in C. The server and client browser extension exceeds 5000 lines of code. All load tests were performed using the Apache JMeter benchmarking tool.

A recent study of web pages indicated that the average web page size is about 130KB total, with an average HTML source size of 25KB and the average non-flash object being just under 10KB [?]. More focused studies of popular websites indicate somewhat larger total sizes ($\approx$ 300KB) [?]. The sizes of the component objects (e.g., images) in popular websites is essentially the same as reported in the broader study, with the increases in the number of embedded objects accounting for the larger total page size. Thus, we use 10KB and 25KB file sizes in all experiments.
Our first set of experiments sought to identify the overheads associated with the delivery of integrity proofs by comparing operation of Spork with that of an unaltered web server. The static content and dynamic content web servers use out-of-the-box installations delivering static and dynamic content, respectively. The dynamic content is generated using 

mod_python. The integrity-measured web servers operate in substantially the same way as the static and dynamic web servers, except that each system creates and delivers integrity proofs with the content. Clients in the integrity-measured experiments receive the content as in normal web server operation, then retrieve the associated proof from the web server as indicated in the X-Attest-URL header. Thus, integrity measured content consists of two serial requests—one each for the content and the proof.

Figure 9 shows throughput of an unaltered web server measured in requests per second (RPS). The throughput of the 10KB static content (average 10,770 RPS) has about 29% higher throughput than the dynamic case (average 7,600 RPS) for 10KB web pages. Such throughput disparities are not atypical in web systems. The additional overheads are due to forking and using a mod_python interpreter. This disparity is further amplified by the static content being delivered from in-memory caches in all tests, i.e., the web server can easily hold all experimental static content in memory. The throughput of the web server serving non-integrity measured 25KB pages for dynamic content are 4,486 and 4,508 RPS for static and dynamic content, respectively. The throughputs are similar because the network is fully utilized.

A comparison of the relative throughput of the web server in the static and dynamic content costs highlights the bottlenecks associated with each content type. The number of bytes sent per second by the web server serving static content of both the 10KB and 25KB pages is essentially the same: 10,770 * 10 = 107,700KB/s ≈ 4,485 * 25 = 112,125KB/s, where 5% more “bytes on the wire” are delivered by serving larger web pages. This slight advantage can be accounted for by overheads of processing individual requests (there is 2.5 times more per-byte HTTP protocol overhead in 10KB web pages). This indicates that the bottleneck in the static case is bandwidth. For dynamic content, the performance does not change drastically from when varying the file size until the network becomes saturated. This indicates that dynamic content service is bound by computation, not by bandwidth.

Illustrated in Figure 10, the average throughput of the integrity-measured web server hovers around 1000 RPS. The overheads relate to the creation and acquisition of proofs by the Spork daemon and their insertion in response web objects. In addition, each request involves serial requests and responses. However, opportunities exist to amortize these costs, discussed further in Sections V-B and V-C.

Integrity-measured dynamic content shows an average throughput of 1100 RPS in both the 10KB and 25KB cases, similar to the non-integrity measured dynamic content where computation, not bandwidth, is the bottleneck. Integrity-measured dynamic content is bounded by the computation of both the content and the proof. The integrity-measured dynamic content also exhibits bursty behavior attributable to the synchronizing effect of the TPM. Clients make a request for dynamic content followed by a request for the corresponding proof and are forced to wait while the TPM generates the quote that includes their page. Once this quote is generated,
clients begin the process again by requesting more content.

Table I shows minimum observed latency and average throughput. To compute latency statistics, we averaged measurements over 150 trials in a system with a single client requesting a single page. The latency represents the time from the first byte sent from the client to the reception of the last byte of the response. Unaltered web latencies range from 490 µsec to 5.4 msec. The latencies observed in the static integrity measured case averaged about 3 msec, where the additional latency can be attributed to multiple HTTP RTTs and the costs of acquiring the proof from the Spork daemon. The dynamic integrity measured latencies were lower than expected values (as discussed in Section III-C), about 1000 msec. These longer latencies are a reflection of the random arrival of the request within the periodic TPM quotations and the time required to create a proof system encompassing the quoted material, e.g., TPM quotation time.

Table II shows latency microbenchmarks of proof creation in an integrity-measured web server. Recall that the proof system is generated by collecting document, time, and system information over which a TPM quote is taken. Such operations are amortized over all requests during the proof system period (as discussed in Section III-B), and are not on the critical path of any content delivery. Nearly 99% of the latency involves the acquisition of the time quote and the local quote operation.\(^4\) These operations are external to the web server processing. The remaining operations are insubstantial in terms of latency and computation. As a result, proof system creation has little impact on the throughput of the web server. Thus, our only hope at improving web server throughput is to address the network and computation bottlenecks within the content delivery process itself.

\(^4\)Recall that the time server simply returns the most recently created time quote. Thus, the latency for acquiring a time proof is largely determined by the RTT between the web and time servers, and not the time to create the time attestation (964 msec).

B. Bandwidth Optimizations

Because we cannot modify the pages directly, we limit bandwidth use by reducing the size of the returned proofs. The proofs are large ASCII XML structures in which the vast majority of content fields are integrity hashes. Because the ASCII text is highly redundant, compressing it could reduce the size of proofs considerably. Conversely, the Policy-Reduced Integrity Measurement Architecture (PRIMA) \(^5\) provides for smaller attestations by reducing the size of the measurement list to include only the specific applications of interest, and can thus be used to significantly reduce the number of integrity hashes included in a quote.\(^6\) We consider the performance of our web server under these strategies: compressed IMA compresses the proofs described in the preceding sections before transmitting to the client, PRIMA implements PRIMA for proofs, and compressed PRIMA compresses the PRIMA proof. We include the performance of a web server delivering the content proofs used in the preceding experiments as full IMA.

The different optimizations reduce proof size as follows. The baseline full IMA generates an 107 KB proof and the full PRIMA reduces to 82k. The reason that the reduction is not very large is that the test environment is already fairly minimal, where the number of measurements needed is smaller than in systems with more services, e.g., database systems. Thus, the policy reduction only removes a handful of services from measurements. Compressing the proof was much more successful, where the IMA and PRIMA proofs were reduced to 32 and 25 KB, respectively.

Returning to Table I, the throughput the web server improves under these bandwidth optimizations. Compression of static content clearly improved throughput. Simply compressing the proofs results in 10-57% increased throughput, with compressed PRIMA proofs seeing a 57% increase. These optimizations had negligible effect on throughput of servers serving dynamic content because bandwidth is not the bottleneck.

Compared to the delivery of static content on an unaltered server, a web server delivering compressed PRIMA proofs will still observe over 85% overhead for 10KB page and 65% in 25KB pages. This is largely due to every integrity-measured static page requiring the processing and delivery of one static and one dynamic page: one for the content and

\(^5\)Additional information about the XML structure and PRIMA can be found in the Appendicies of [7].
one for the proof. While compression techniques mitigate the delivery of the dynamic page, it does nothing to mitigate the computational costs of its creation. Thus, our next best hope is to alter the relationship between the number of requested pages and requested proofs.

C. Proof Amortization

Recall that prior studies of web pages show that an average page has one root HTML page and just over 10 static 10KB embedded objects. As a matter of practice, a client requesting that page will obtain the root page and all of its embedded objects for rendering. This reality presents an opportunity: a proof for a web page can be computed over the root document and all embedded objects at once. Thus, we can amortize proof generation over all elements of a web page, significantly reducing the number of proofs requested by a client.

Consider a naive calculation of the expected per-second web server throughput under this discipline. The expected throughput of a web server $P$ can be computed in pages as:

$$\frac{1}{P} = \left( 10 \times \frac{1}{\mu} \right) + \frac{1}{\epsilon}$$

where $\mu$ is the service time for a web server serving a 10KB static object and $\epsilon$ is the service time for the web server serving static (dynamic) 25KB HTML files. The model assumes that the unit “cost” per object on a hypothetical throughput budget is fixed and independent of other documents.

Table III shows the expected and experimentally-measured “real” throughput of the amortized proofs. We show the parameters in terms of throughput (i.e., the inverse of the service time) for clarity, with the expected throughput computed using the measurements presented in Table I. Interestingly, the model underestimates throughput considerably in most cases. This is because the computation fails to model both bottlenecks at the same time, and thus misses the positive effect of interleaving requests for content (limited by bandwidth) and content proof acquisition (limited by computation). Practically speaking, the costs of finding and delivering proofs from the Spork daemon to the web server are hidden by bottlenecked delivery of content. Thus, a web server providing integrity measured content can achieve web object throughputs within 13% of the maximum web server.

VI. DISCUSSION

Our Firefox extension validates content proofs acquired from the modified web server at page load. The extension examines the X-Attest-URL header after the page loads. If this header is correctly formed, the associated content proof is requested from the web server and validated. First, the extension validates the system attestation from the web server and the attestation from the time service. Once the system and time attestations are validated, the succinct content proof is checked by reconstructing the hash tree from the provided nodes and the downloaded content. Once the root of the tree is computed, it is compared to the value provided in the signature. Once everything is validated (or invalidated), the user is notified by simple icons on the status bar of Firefox, similar to Privacy Bird [2], or SSL.

The Firefox interface is modified as shown in Figure 11. In Figure 11, we see a page that is loaded, and the user has been notified via a dialog box that the validation of the content proof has failed. The user is still shown the page, but is aware that the page is invalid. This is similar to Firefox’s default operation of allowing a user to view a page even if the serverside SSL certificate is invalid. When a page is valid, a green check mark is shown instead of a red X. No other prompting is used when the page is valid.

The system requires that web server and the time server TPMs keys and verification measurement lists be loaded at installation. In real deployments, it is likely that the clients will be bootstrapped with a separate public measurement signing key associated with the services they are measuring. This key would be used to sign measurement lists provided periodically by administrators and possibly provided through the web server as separate URLs. Administrative systems supporting integrity services are being actively studied by the integrity measurement community, and we will make use of these systems as they become available.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

This paper has introduced the Spork system. Spork uses the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) to tie the web server integrity state to the web content delivered to browsers. This allows a client to verify that the origin of the content was functioning properly when the received content was generated/delivered. We discussed the design and implementation of the Spork service and its browser-side Firefox validation extension. In particular, we explored optimizations that enable us to mitigate the inherent bottlenecks of delivering integrity-measured content.

An in-depth empirical analysis of Spork confirmed the scalability of Spork to large bodies communities. Spork delivered almost 8,000 static or 7,000 dynamic integrity-measured objects per-second with manageable latencies.

We are just now beginning to understand the use of integrity-measurement in web systems. In the future we will explore the extension of Spork to collections of web servers,
Table III

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$\mu$</th>
<th>$\epsilon$</th>
<th>$E'$</th>
<th>Web Objects</th>
<th>$A'$</th>
<th>Web Objects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline with Static Root Page</td>
<td>10769</td>
<td>4485.5</td>
<td>868.4</td>
<td>9552.5</td>
<td>867.4</td>
<td>9541.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline with Dynamic Root Page</td>
<td>10769</td>
<td>4507.8</td>
<td>869.2</td>
<td>9561.7</td>
<td>745.9</td>
<td>8204.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integ. Measured Static Root (Full IMA)</td>
<td>10769</td>
<td>968.1</td>
<td>509.8</td>
<td>5607.8</td>
<td>494.9</td>
<td>5444.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integ. Measured Static Root (Comp. PRIMA)</td>
<td>10769</td>
<td>1526.8</td>
<td>631.5</td>
<td>6946.4</td>
<td>724.3</td>
<td>7967.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integ. Measured Dynamic Root (Full IMA)</td>
<td>10769</td>
<td>1130.7</td>
<td>551.6</td>
<td>6067.3</td>
<td>494.4</td>
<td>6438.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integ. Measured Dynamic Root (Comp. PRIMA)</td>
<td>10769</td>
<td>1127.2</td>
<td>550.7</td>
<td>6058.1</td>
<td>650.5</td>
<td>7155.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e.g., web farms, and as a mechanism to provide integrity guarantees over services spanning administrative domains, e.g., mash-ups. The system itself will also evolve, and we plan to apply new cryptographic techniques to further reduce overheads and increase the flexibility of the system, e.g., partial signatures. Lastly, we are in the process of building real web-applications that make use the Spork services and study their use in deployed environments.