CSE543 - Introduction to Computer and Network Security

Module: Authentication

Professor Trent Jaeger
Reading papers …

• What is the purpose of reading research papers?
• How do you read research papers?
Understanding what you read

- Things you should be getting out of a paper
  - What is the central idea proposed/explored in the paper?
    - Abstract
    - Introduction
    - Conclusions
    - These are the best areas to find an overview of the contribution
  - Motivation: What is the problem being addressed?
  - How does this work fit into others in the area?
    - Related work - often a separate section, sometimes not, every paper should detail the relevant literature. Papers that do not do this or do a superficial job are almost sure to be bad ones.
    - An informed reader should be able to read the related work and understand the basic approaches in the area, and why they do not solve the problem effectively
Understanding what you read (cont.)

• What scientific devices are the authors using to communicate their point?
  ‣ Methodology - this is how they evaluate their solution.
    • Theoretical papers typically validate a model using mathematical arguments (e.g., proofs)
    • Experimental papers evaluate results based on a design of a test apparatus (e.g., measurements, data mining, synthetic workload simulation, trace-based simulation).
      ‣ Empirical research evaluates by measurement.
    • Some papers have no evaluation at all, but argue the merits of the solution in prose (e.g., paper design papers)
Understanding what you read (cont.)

• What do the authors claim?
  ‣ **Results** - statement of new scientific discovery.
    • Typically some abbreviated form of the results will be present in the abstract, introduction, and/or conclusions.
    • **Note**: just because a result was accepted into a conference or journal does necessarily not mean that it is true. **Always be circumspect**.

• What should you remember about this paper?
  ‣ **Take away** - what general lesson or fact should you take away from the paper.
  ‣ Note that really good papers will have take-aways that are more general than the paper topic.
Summarize Thompson Article

• Contribution
• Motivation
• Related work
• Methodology
• Results
• Take away
• **Contribution:** Ken Thompson shows how hard it is to trust the security of software in this paper. He describes an approach whereby he can embed a Trojan horse in a compiler that can insert malicious code on a trigger (e.g., recognizing a login program).

• **Motivation:** People need to recognize the security limitations of programming.

• **Related Work:** This approach is an example of a Trojan horse program. A Trojan horse is a program that serves a legitimate purpose on the surface, but includes malicious code that will be executed with it. Examples include the Sony/BMG rootkit: the program provided music legitimately, but also installed spyware.

• **Methodology:** The approach works by generating a malicious binary that is used to compile compilers. Since the compiler code looks OK and the malice is in the binary compiler compiler, it is difficult to detect.

• **Results:** The system identifies construction of login programs and miscompiles the command to accept a particular password known to the attacker.

• **Take away:** *What is the transcendent truth?????* (see next slide)
• **Take away:** Thompson states the “obvious” moral that “you cannot trust code that you did not totally create yourself.” We all depend on code, but constructing a basis for trusting it is very hard, even today.

• ... or “**trust in security is an infinite regression** ...”

“A well-known scientist (some say it was Bertrand Russell) once gave a public lecture on astronomy. He described how the earth orbits around the sun and how the sun, in turn, orbits around the center of a vast collection of stars called our galaxy. At the end of the lecture, a little old lady at the back of the room got up and said: "What you have told us is rubbish. The world is really a flat plate supported on the back of a giant tortoise." The scientist gave a superior smile before replying, "What is the tortoise standing on?" "You're very clever, young man, very clever", said the old lady. "But it's turtles all the way down!"

Authentication and Authorization

• Fundamental mechanisms to enforce security on a system

• Authentication: Identify the principal responsible for a “message”
  ‣ Distinguish friend from foe

• Authorization: Control access to system resources based on the identity of a principal
  ‣ Determine whether a principal has the permissions to perform a restricted operation

• Today, we discuss principles behind authentication
What is Authentication?

• **Short answer**: establishes identity
  ‣ Answers the question: To whom am I speaking?

• **Long answer**: evaluates the authenticity of identity by proving credentials
  ‣ **Credential** – is proof of identity
  ‣ **Evaluation** – process that assesses the correctness of the association between credential and claimed identity
    • for some purpose
    • under some policy (what constitutes a good cred.?)
Why authentication?

• Well, we live in a world of rights, permissions, and duties
  ‣ Authentication establishes our identity so that we can obtain the set of rights
  ‣ E.g., we establish our identity with Tiffany’s by providing a valid credit card which gives us rights to purchase goods ~ physical authentication system

• Q: How does this relate to security?
Why authentication (cont.)?

• Same in online world, just different constraints
  ‣ Vendor/customer are not physically co-located, so we must find other ways of providing identity
    • e.g., by providing credit card number ~ electronic authentication system
  ‣ Risks (for customer and vendor) are different
    • Q: How so?

• Computer security is crucially dependent on the proper design, management, and application of authentication systems.
What is Identity?

• That which gives you access … which is largely determined by context
  ‣ We all have lots of identities
  ‣ Pseudo-identities

• Really, determined by who is evaluating credential
  ‣ Driver’s License, Passport, SSN prove …
  ‣ Credit cards prove …
  ‣ Signature proves …
  ‣ Password proves …
  ‣ Voice proves …

• Exercise: Give an example of bad mapping between identity and the purpose for which it was used.
Credentials

• ... are evidence used to prove identity

• Credentials can be
  ‣ Something I am
  ‣ Something I have
  ‣ Something I know
Something you know …

• Passport number, mother’s maiden name, last 4 digits of your social security, credit card number

• Passwords and pass-phrases
  ‣ Note: passwords have historically been pretty weak
    • University of Michigan: 5% of passwords were goblue
    • Passwords used in more than one place
  ‣ Not just because bad ones selected: If you can remember it, then a computer can guess it
    • Computers can often guess very quickly
    • Easy to mount offline attacks
    • Easy countermeasures for online attacks
“Hoist with his own petard”

• The rule of seven plus or minus two.
  ‣ George Miller observed in 1956 that most humans can remember about 5-9 things more or less at once.
  ‣ Thus is a kind of maximal entropy that one can hold in your head.
  ‣ This limits the complexity of the passwords you can securely use, i.e., not write on a sheet of paper.
  ‣ A perfectly random 8-char password has less entropy than a 56-bit key.

• Implication?
Password Use

- **Naively**: Retrieve password for ID from database and check against that supplied password
  - Baravelli: ...you can't come in unless you give the password.
  - Professor Wagstaff: Well, what is the password?
  - Baravelli: Aw, no. You gotta tell me. Hey, I tell what I do. I give you three guesses. It's the name of a fish.
  - ........
  - [Slams door. Professor Wagstaff knocks again. Baravelli opens peephole again.] Hey, what's-a matter, you no understand English? You can't come in here unless you say, "Swordfish." Now I'll give you one more guess.
  - Professor Wagstaff: ...swordfish, swordfish... I think I got it. Is it "swordfish"?
  - Professor Wagstaff: Pretty good, eh?

  [Marx Brothers, *Horse Feathers*]

- **How should you store passwords to protect them?**
  - Just storing them in a file gives anyone with access to the file your password
Password Storage

• Store password as a “hash” of its value

• What properties must hash function satisfy for this purpose?
  ‣ Should hash entries be invertible?
  ‣ Could two passwords result in the same hash value?
Password Storage

• Store password as a “hash” of its value
  ‣ Originally stored in /etc/passwd file (readable by all)
  ‣ Now in /etc/shadow (readable only be root)

• What if an adversary can gain access to a password file?
  ‣ How would you attack this?
Password Cracking

• Attacker can access the hashed password
  ‣ Can guess and test passwords offline
• Called “password cracking”
• Lots of help
  ‣ John the Ripper
• How well do these work?
“Salt”ing passwords

• Suppose you want to avoid a offline dictionary attack
  ‣ bad guy precomputing popular passwords and looking at the password file

• A salt is a random number added to the password differentiate passwords when stored in /etc/shadow

  \[
  \begin{align*}
  &salt_1, h(salt_1, pw_1) \\
  &salt_i, h(salt_2, pw_2) \\
  &salt_i, h(salt_3, pw_3) \\
  &\vdots \\
  &salt_n, h(salt_n, pw_n)
  \end{align*}
  \]

• consequence: guesses each password independently
Something your have ...

- Tokens (transponders, …)
  - Speedpass, EZ-pass
  - SecureID
- Smartcards
  - Unpowered processors
  - Small NV storage
  - Tamper resistant
- Digital Certificates (used by Websites to authenticate themselves to customers)
  - More on this later …
A (simplified) sample token device

- A one-time password system that essentially uses a hash chain as authenticators.
  - For seed \((S)\) and chain length \((l)\)
  - Tamperproof token encodes \(S\) in firmware
  
  \[
pw_i = h^{l-i}(S)
  \]
  
  - Device display shows password for epoch \(i\)
  - Time synchronization allows authentication server to know what \(i\) is expected, and authenticate the user.

- **Note**: somebody can see your token display at some time but learn nothing useful for later periods.
Something your are ...

• Biometrics measure some physical characteristic
  ‣ Fingerprint, face recognition, retina scanners, voice, signature, DNA
  ‣ Can be extremely accurate and fast
  ‣ Active biometrics authenticate
  ‣ Passive biometrics recognize

• Issues with biometrics?
  ‣ Revocation – lost fingerprint?
  ‣ “fuzzy” credential, e.g., your face changes based on mood ...
Biometrics Example

• A fingerprint biometric device (of several)
  ‣ record the conductivity of the surface of your finger to build a “map” of the ridges
  ‣ scanned map converted into a graph by looking for landmarks, e.g., ridges, cores, ...
Fingerprint Biometrics (cont.)

- Graph is compared to database of authentic identities
- Graph is same, the person deemed “authentic”
  - This is a variant of the graph isomorphism problem
  - Problem: what does it mean to be the “same enough”
    - rotation
    - imperfect contact
    - finger damage

- *Fundamental Problem*: False accept vs. false reject rates?
Project #1

• In Project #1, you will build a Password Management System using the OpenSSL library

• Password management
  • Store mapping between Internet domains and passwords, so users don’t have to remember them

• System you will build
  • Input domain/password pairs
  • Strengthen password to satisfy a “guess” threshold
  • Store encrypted passwords in key-value store
    • Prevent leakage of domain and password data when stored on disk
    • Value and length
  • Lookup password by domain
  • Fastest method to strengthen on my inputs - wins a 10% bonus
Cracking Passwords

• How hard are passwords to crack?
• How many 8-character passwords are there given that 128 characters are available?
Cracking Passwords

• How hard are passwords to crack?
• How many 8-character passwords given that 128 characters are available?
  • $128^8 = 2^{56}$
• How many guesses to find one specific user’s password?
  • $2^{56}/2 = 2^{55}$
Cracking w/ Dictionaries

• How hard are passwords to crack?
• How many 8-character passwords are there given that 128 characters are available?
  • \(128^8 = 2^{56}\)
• Suppose we use a dictionary where there is a 25% chance that that user’s password appears in that password dictionary. How many guesses then? (Assume 1 million dictionary entries)
  • \(\frac{1}{4}(2^{19}) + \frac{3}{4}(2^{56}) \approx 2^{54.6}\)
• However, you probably simply apply the dictionary and accept a 25% chance of recovery
Cracking w/ Dictionaries

• How hard are passwords to crack?
• How many 8-character passwords are there given that 128 characters are available?
  • \(128^8 = 2^{56}\)
• But, in practice the attacker just needs one password from a set of users - rather than a specific user
• If there are 1024 users, the basic work effort is now
  • \(2^{55}/2^{10} = 2^{45}\)
• However, given a dictionary, we can simply see if one of the 1024 passwords are in the dictionary
  • About equal to size of dictionary/prob. in dictionary
Guess Again...

• How do you know if your password will be guessed?
  ‣ Follow password-composition policies

• Example properties
  ‣ *Length*: 8 or 12 or 16 chars?
  ‣ *Requirements*: Password must contain at least one...
  ‣ *Blacklist*: Password must not contain a dictionary word

• How do you know which policy to choose?
Guess Number

• How do you predict how many guesses it will take to crack your password?
  ‣ Try to crack it?
    • That can be time consuming
  ‣ Compute number of guesses it would take?
    • How do we do that?
Guess Number

• Use **specific cracking algorithm** to compute number of guesses it would take to crack a specific password
  ‣ Produce a deterministic guess ordering

• For “brute-force Markov” cracker
  ‣ Uses frequencies of start chars and following chars
    • Most likely first, most likely to follow that, and so on...
  ‣ Sum the number of guesses to find each character
    • In an N character alphabet and a password of length L:
      ‣ The first character is the kth char tried in \((k-1)N^{l-1}\) guesses
      ‣ The second character is the kth char tried in \((k-1)N^{l-2}\) guesses
      ‣ Etc.
Guessing Passwords

• Suppose password is “CAC”
  • In character set {ABC}
• Start with highest probability start - A
  • Compute all passwords that start with A
  • In highest probability order - count so far - \( k^n = 9 \)
• Then go to the next highest prob. start - say C
  • Next highest prob. for second char - A
  • Then A, B, C for third char
• For a guess number of 13
Guess Number

• Use specific cracking algorithm to compute number of guesses it would take to crack a specific password
  ‣ Produce a deterministic guess ordering

• For “Weir” cracker
  • (Probabilistic Context-Free Grammar)
    ‣ Uses probabilities of password structures
      • E.g., Small letter ^ N + Number ^ 1 + Capital letter ^ M …

• Computing guess number
  ‣ Determine the guesses necessary to reach the “probability group” for that password
  ‣ Add number of further guesses to reach exact password
Guessing Passwords

• Suppose highest password is “BA1”
  • In character set {AB1}
• Start with highest probability struct - {L^2D^1}
  • Search for most likely L^2 and most likely D^1
• For Markov, search from highest probability - A
  • \(K^n = 2\)
  • Next highest prob. - B
  • Then A
  • Then 1 for D^1
• For a guess number of 3
How Many Guesses For?

• By password-composition policy

Figure 1. The number of passwords cracked vs. number of guesses, per condition, for experiment E. This experiment uses the Weir calculator and our most comprehensive training set, which combines our passwords with public data.
Train a Cracker?

- Training helps for some, but not all

Figure 4. Showing how increasing training data by adding the Openwall list (P4) and then our collected passwords (E) affects cracking, for four example conditions. Adding training data proves more helpful for the group 1 conditions (top) than for the others (bottom).
Making Strong Passwords

- Can you help people make strong(er) passwords?
  - Suggestion
    - Have user pick a password
    - Evaluate its strength
    - Make (few) modifications until password is “strong”
  - Would this work?
Making Strong Passwords

• Suppose user picks a crummy initial password
  • Say ‘password’
  • And the method makes a couple of edits
    • ‘pass3word’ and ‘pass3w0rd’

• Are the resultant passwords actually secure from cracking?
  • D. Schmidt and T. Jaeger, “Pitfalls in the Automated Strengthening of Passwords,” ACSAC 2013
Making Strong Passwords

• Suppose user picks a crummy initial password
  • Say ‘password’
  • And the method makes a couple of edits
  • ‘pass3word’ and ‘pass3w0rd’

• How secure is the resultant password?
  • How does training impact how many guesses to crack?
  • Does knowledge of the strengthening approach help?
Using Knowledge

• What if adversary knows the password construction approach you are using?
• Could an adversary leverage that knowledge in guessing?
Using Knowledge

• What if adversary knows the password construction approach you are using?
  • Could an adversary leverage that knowledge in guessing?
  • Of course, so our computation of guess probabilities must account for all password construction knowledge

• E.g., Houshmand and Aggarwal suggest making one or two mods to a simple, user-chosen password to strengthen
  • Will it work if an adversary knows the approach?
Strengthen Dataset

- One attack approach is to strengthen the guessing dataset using the same approach
- Then, compute the guess numbers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Edits</th>
<th>$10^{-13}$</th>
<th>$10^{-14}$</th>
<th>$10^{-15}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Strong are guess probabilities using the strengthened dataset - weak are original
- Ideally, all would be 0
Brute Force

- Or you can simply brute force guess them from the simple passwords
- Guess a simple password and a single edit to that password

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Min GP</th>
<th>Edits</th>
<th>Full?</th>
<th>Run Time, 12 cores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$10^{-9}$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1.2 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10^{-9}$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>8 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10^{-10}$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>12.7 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10^{-10}$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1.3 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10^{-11}$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1 week (est)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10^{-11}$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>16.2 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10^{-9}$</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Guessed 5.4% in 24 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10^{-9}$</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>20.4 hours</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Full character set is only used in “Full?”